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Abstract
Dynamic consent aims to empower research partners and facilitate active participation in the research process. Used within
the context of biobanking, it gives individuals access to information and control to determine how and where their
biospecimens and data should be used. We present Dwarna—a web portal for ‘dynamic consent’ that acts as a hub
connecting the different stakeholders of the Malta Biobank: biobank managers, researchers, research partners, and the
general public. The portal stores research partners’ consent in a blockchain to create an immutable audit trail of research
partners’ consent changes. Dwarna’s structure also presents a solution to the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation’s right to erasure—a right that is seemingly incompatible with the blockchain model. Dwarna’s transparent
structure increases trustworthiness in the biobanking process by giving research partners more control over which research
studies they participate in, by facilitating the withdrawal of consent and by making it possible to request that the biospecimen
and associated data are destroyed.
Introduction
Trust is a major pillar in the relational dynamics within the
process of genomic research. This ﬁeld requires robust and
transparent consenting procedures to be ethical, and only
through consistently being ethical can trust be achieved. In
fact, Lipworth, Forsyth, and Kerridge describe winning trust
as a gradual process—“an emergent property of good social
relationships that are built over time” [1].
Biobanking sees biobank managers collect or curate
biospecimens, such as DNA, from the general public or
from individuals affected by a speciﬁc disease. These
biospecimens are stored for long-term use in the biobank,
alongside links to personal health and lifestyle data to be
used by researchers in scientiﬁc studies [1].
For this reason, biobanking for genomic research has
complex ethical, legal, and social implications [2]. Informed
consent is the backbone underlying participation in
research, ensuring the practice of ethical principles in line
with the Helsinki Declaration [3]. Informed consent ‘pro-
tects the individual’s freedom of choice and respects the
individual’s autonomy’ [4], thus safeguarding the funda-
mental rights of human dignity and integrity [5, 6]. The
process of recruitment in biobanking, and engagement in
research participation can be improved if consent is not a
one-off event but is sustained throughout the research, a
process called dynamic consent [7].
Dynamic consent is one protocol of consent that is
ethical and complies with the law and regulations [2, 8]. It
aims to give individuals the opportunity to be better
informed about their consent choices and the ongoing
research process in general, and gives them control over
how their biospecimens and data are used. This process can
be facilitated if dynamic consent is available on a digital
platform, which can also be used to register interest in
participating in new research projects. In this way, dynamic
consent sees individuals not simply as research participants,
but as research partners who make their own decisions on
how to participate.
At the Malta Biobank, we have now chosen to con-
sistently apply the term ‘research partner’ for individuals
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providing a biospecimen for current or future research.
Although this term is not yet in uniform use, we strongly
believe that dynamic consent is a tool that permits
“understanding and supporting biomedical research as a
partnership between participants and researchers” [2] and
places research participants “at the centre of decision
making as equal partners in the research process” [9].
Thus, genuine participation in participant-centered research
initiatives will hopefully result in research participants
being “not just subjects for research and interventions, but
instead partners” [10].
In this paper, we present Dwarna, a web portal for
dynamic consent that harnesses the blockchain model. The
term Dwarna—‘about us’ in Maltese—represents the pro-
ject’s objective of helping genomic research to gather data
about humans, with the ultimate aim of improving health-
care for the wider community.
The project is hosted at the Centre for Molecular Medi-
cine and Biobanking at the University of Malta, which itself
hosts the Malta Biobank [11]—the Maltese national node of
BBMRI-ERIC [12]. The Dwarna portal will act as a hub
connecting the biobank managers, researchers, research
partners, and the general public. Dwarna has a data con-
troller who ensures that the portal operates in compliance
with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) so as
to safeguard research partners. The data controller of
Dwarna is the same individual as the data controller of the
Malta Biobank, who is also the biobank manager.
In Dwarna, we use the blockchain for its immutable
nature, storing in it the research partners’ consent changes
more transparently. However, the blockchain is perceived as
being in conﬂict with the European Union’s recently
introduced GDPR, which encourages data minimization and
gives citizens the right to erasure (also known as the right to
be forgotten) [13]. The right to erasure gives individuals the
right to request that the data that an institution stores about
them are destroyed. Thus, we present a solution that over-
comes these challenges to comply with the regulation and
ensure the rights of individuals are securely protected.
In this paper, we ﬁrst explore existing systems for
obtaining consent in the ﬁeld of genomic research and the
blockchain. Subsequently, we present Dwarna’s archi-
tecture. Finally, we discuss how Dwarna contributes a more
trustworthy solution to biobanking.
Related work
This section provides an insight into how dynamic consent
can potentially make biobanking, and subsequently geno-
mic research, more efﬁcient and transparent. This section
also explores the blockchain and existing applications in
healthcare and genomic research.
Biobanking and informed consent
From minimizing ﬁnancial burdens [14] to gathering com-
prehensive medical histories [15], data sharing in healthcare
presents a multitude of beneﬁts. When framed within the
context of rare diseases, it is clear that linkages between
datasets across research centers are key to progress in
research [16]. This said, sharing sensitive data is also a
process that incurs risks, not least the risk of losing control
over this data. Today, control is not only desirable [17], but
demanded by the research partners themselves [8, 18, 19]
and emphasized in the European Union’s GDPR, where
recital 7 states that “natural persons should have control of
their own personal data” [20].
In the ﬁeld of medical research, biobanking relies on
individuals sharing their biospecimens and data with bio-
banks. Biobank managers collect biological samples, such
as blood, tissues, cells, and DNA, and associated health and
lifestyle data from research partners, store them and make
them available to researchers for use in scientiﬁc research
projects [21]. In the past, there have been two key
approaches for the consenting procedure for biobank-based
research.
The most common approach is broad consent whereby
research partners give consent for the use of their biospe-
cimens and data, sometimes with few speciﬁc restrictions
[22], or none at all [23]. This enables their reuse for future,
as yet unspeciﬁed, research projects without the need of
being re-contacted or consulted. Whereas broad consent
does facilitate the optimal use of the biospecimens and
associated data, it also comes at the expense of participant
engagement and control, which may adversely affect will-
ingness to take part in research. The alternative is a one-
time informed consent for a speciﬁc research project, which
signiﬁcantly limits the possibility of using the biospecimen
and its data to their maximum potential in other research
studies [23].
While offering the best potential for reuse of research
partners’ biospecimens and data, broad consent is also
associated with ethical lacunae. It restricts autonomy in
decision making as to whether the aims and risks of a new
research project are acceptable, though speciﬁc limitations
can be inbuilt to limit this, particularly by ensuring “over-
sight and approval of future research activities” and “an
ongoing process of providing information” [22]. Research
has found that “the more unclear the purpose of the sample
and data usage is, the less there is a trust in the ‘appro-
priateness’ of research” [24]. The key issue is the ambi-
guity of ‘informed consent’. Informed consent expects
researchers to provide research partners with details of how
their sample shall be used, yet the future of biotechnology is
unanticipatable and thus the potential future uses of bios-
pecimens or data are unknown [21]. More recently, a new
N. Mamo et al.
alternative, delivered through digital technology, has
emerged—dynamic consent [2].
Dynamic consent does not automatically exclude broad
consent. Instead, it is a new and enhanced option of
informed consent that gives research partners greater control
over the extent of their participation, providing the possi-
bility of re-considering consent to participate at different
stages of a research project, allowing any arising ethical
issues to be addressed. This is particularly likely in the ever-
developing ﬁeld of genomic research. Due to potential
future developments in genomic research, the exclusive use
of one-time consent is questionable if ethical standards are
to be preserved. Since biobanks store biospecimens for
decades, one-time consent cannot be regarded as informed
consent, as new, unforeseen, biotechnologies are bound to
be invented. Thus, what is required is an ongoing process of
consent which reﬂects these developments [2].
Kaye et al. [2] further claim that dynamic consent
enhances respect for research partners by “giving indivi-
duals as much choice and control in what is done with their
personal information and material as is reasonably
achievable.” Simultaneously, the practice of pseudonymi-
zation and data encryption safeguards conﬁdentiality.
Dynamic consent is normally delivered via an IT inter-
face that serves as a communication system between sta-
keholders; namely the biobank managers and researchers at
one end, and the research partners at the other end. In this
way, existing dynamic consent implementations, such as
those by the NHS [25] or RUDY [8, 26] in the UK, and the
Cooperative Health Research in South Tyrol (CHRIS)
[27, 28] allow research partners to become active members
in the research process [2].
With dynamic consent, research partners may give con-
sent to participate in ongoing projects and may also with-
draw consent at any point. Thus, research partners enjoy
greater control over their biospecimens and personal data
whilst remaining in an ongoing relationship with biobanks
[2]. Although research partners reserve the right to with-
draw consent or ask for their biospecimen and data to be
destroyed, this only applies to future uses, and does not
affect already-processed data. Research partners who
withdraw consent after their data have been processed shall
not have their biospecimen reused and any link between the
data and the biospecimen is destroyed. Nevertheless,
already-processed data can still be used as its removal is
usually not possible and would hinder research [29].
By giving research partners more control, dynamic
consent also involves individuals in the decision-making
process of genomic research. Research conducted by
Robinson et al. [30] revealed that the vast majority
of individuals participating in genomic research prefer
to be involved in the decision-making process of data
sharing among researchers. In turn, such a dynamic
consent system keeps them better informed and provides
transparency.
Most participants in genomic research are likely to accept
data sharing if they are well-informed [31, 32]. Data sharing
is at the core of best practice in genomic research as it
allows for the maximum exploitation of the available data.
Reluctance to share data often implies that the ultimate
motive is personal accomplishment and not the common
good [1]. Thus, ethically-sound genomic research calls for
data sharing and reuse in different scientiﬁc research [33].
Dynamic consent is also ideal for improving trust-
worthiness [2]. Potentiating trustworthiness of biobanking
activity in the eyes of the lay public and patient commu-
nities has been clearly identiﬁed in literature as being the
key to ethical sustainability [34–38]. The key to building
this trust is developing a system of governance based on
accountability, transparency, and user control, which
accommodates and protects the needs and rights of all sta-
keholders: research partners, researchers, and political or
private sponsors [34, 35]. Such a goal can only be achieved
by the use of transparent governance procedures [33].
Transparency protects the functioning of genomic
research. Research shows that when research partners are
informed and are offered a choice about what happens with
their data, they are more likely to trust researchers, and
consequently more likely to give consent for the use of their
genetic data, as they perceive researchers as accountable
and reliable [30].
Although transparency is dependent on the biobank’s
functioning, laws and regulations like the GDPR heap
responsibility on entities within the European Union to
protect research partners’ personal data. Nevertheless, the
technological solutions that host dynamic consent evoke
concerns of privacy [39, 40] and security [39]. In health-
care, the blockchain model is emerging as one solution to
these issues by contributing transparency and accountability
[41].
Blockchain
The blockchain model owes its origin to a 2008 white paper
by Satoshi Nakamoto, who portrayed the blockchain as a
network with a ﬁnancial application—the Bitcoin crypto-
currency. Fundamentally, the blockchain is a distributed,
immutable ledger—blocks of transactions chained together
and shared by all nodes in the blockchain network [42].
In Nakamoto’s original proposal, nodes, or peers, traded
Bitcoin among each other using public-key cryptography.
To construct transactions, peers have a pair of public and
private keys; the former is known by all nodes in the
blockchain, whereas the latter is kept secret.
Peers use the private key to digitally sign their transac-
tions. This digital signature can be decrypted using the
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paired public key, which yields the transaction contents.
However, if someone maliciously tampers with the trans-
action, the transaction would not match with the decrypted
digital signature. Thus, digital signatures make blockchain
transactions tamper-proof.
The blockchain broadcasts all transactions to some nodes
known as miners. Miners validate transactions, group them
into a block and ﬁnd a solution to a mathematical challenge
to commit the block to the blockchain in return for a reward.
The challenge incorporates this block of transactions and
information from the previous block, as shown in Fig. 1.
The reference to the previous block is its hash—a static-
sized representation of the block’s contents that effectively
cannot be reversed. The solution to the challenge is a
number, known as a nonce. This nonce acts as proof-of-
work and is meant to be easily-veriﬁable.
The blockchain uses the proof-of-work consensus
mechanism to secure the chain’s integrity; maliciously
tampering with one intermediate block changes its hash,
which acts as the link with the next block. Therefore, the
change invalidates the proof-of-work of all ensuing blocks,
which have to be recalculated. Since only the longest
blockchain is ever accepted as valid, Nakamoto shows how
reworking the proof-of-work of these blocks transforms
malicious intent into a chase to catch up with the other,
honest miners.
As the blockchain extends, old transactions and their
Bitcoin are more likely to have been spent, rendering them
useless. Therefore, old transactions need not be retained.
Nakamoto’s solution is to replace the blocks with simpler
block headers that replace transactions with the Merkle
Root. The Merkle Root is constructed from the Merkle Tree
—a binary tree with transactions as leaves. To get to the
Merkle Root, the transactions are hashed. Subsequently,
climbing up the tree, pairs of hashes are hashed again until
only one hash remains—the Merkle Root, as shown in
Fig. 2a).
Furthermore, not all hashes need to be retained to
recalculate the Merkle Root. In the example of Fig. 2b),
Transaction4, Hash3, and Hash1,2 are enough to calculate the
Merkle Root and thus verify a block’s integrity. The Merkle
Root is stored in the block’s header, alongside the necessary
transactions and hashes, cutting down on storage space.
More importantly, even with this limited data, the block’s
hash is not broken.
Although the proof-of-work helps secure the block-
chain’s integrity, it forces miners to compete to add blocks
to the blockchain. The redundant efforts of miners results in
extra energy overhead. Thus, other consensus mechanisms
have been proposed. For example, in the proof-of-stake, the
miner who adds a block to the blockchain is chosen based
on how much cryptocurrency they can prove to hold [43].
Fig. 1 The typical blockchain structure. Figure adapted from Nakamoto [42].
Fig. 2 The block structure.
a The calculation of the Merkle
Root with pruned elements made
transparent and b the block
header after removing
unnecessary data. Figure
adapted from Nakamoto [42].
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These consensus mechanisms make it difﬁcult to retro-
spectively alter the blockchain, practically making it
immutable, and thus an alluring tool for various sectors,
including healthcare.
Whereas Nakamoto’s Bitcoin’s blockchain has a narrow
ﬁnancial focus, the wide array of the blockchain’s appli-
cations has necessitated the creation of other digital ledgers.
One such popular blockchain is Ethereum [34].
Although the principles of the blockchain remain,
Ethereum’s scope is wider with its smart contracts, or self-
executing code that can represent arbitrary applications. In
this way, smart contracts bring applications from different
industries into one blockchain. As a result, instead of having
one cryptocurrency for each application, all of these smart
contracts trade with the same cryptocurrency—ether.
Although a public Ethereum blockchain exists, it is also
open-source, and can be downloaded and hosted privately.
With the blockchain being used in more sensitive environ-
ments, including healthcare, as discussed later, restricting
participant access to view or modify the ledger is imperative.
For this reason, other blockchain frameworks offer the
possibility of hosting the blockchain privately, opening it up
only to a select group of nodes. Hyperledger Composer
[35], itself based on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain
framework [36], is one such solution.
Hyperledger Composer
Hyperledger Fabric is an open-source framework for pri-
vate, or permissioned, blockchains developed initially by
the Linux Foundation, and later supported by companies
such as IBM. As a blockchain framework, Hyperledger
Fabric is immutable, with a two-piece ledger made up of a
transaction log, akin to the more traditional ledger, and a
current world state. Having an always-updated world state
makes querying much more efﬁcient in Hyperledger Fabric
than in other blockchains.
Moreover, unlike Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric has no
cryptocurrency associated with it. In blockchains like Ether-
eum, cryptocurrency serves as an incentive for miners.
Without cryptocurrency, the intensive proof-of-work scheme
is unnecessary because there are no rewards to be won by
miners. Thus, Hyperledger Fabric affords a more efﬁcient
scheme to add blocks to the ledger, as described next.
When network participants make a transaction, the
involved peers endorse it to create a proposal. Other peers in
the network, called ‘endorsing peers’ and deﬁned by the
blockchain’s endorsement policy, validate the transaction.
They also execute the transaction against the ledger to get
the updated state, although the ledger itself is not updated at
this point. The endorsing peers return responses with the
values of the executed transaction.
If the responses differ, potentially indicating non-
determinism, the transaction is rejected. If all returned
responses are the same, these responses are sent to an
ordering service, which orders responses chronologically
into blocks of transactions. These blocks are broadcast to all
peers in the blockchain, which validate the transactions and
update their own ledger.
Like Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric adopts the concept of
smart contracts, or chaincode. Hyperledger Composer
facilitates developing the chaincode through the business
network deﬁnition. This deﬁnition includes assets, or items
that are traded in the blockchain network; participants that
own or modify these assets; and the transactions that effect
these changes and form blocks in the blockchain.
To facilitate development, Hyperledger Composer can
serve REST APIs to manage the network model. REST
APIs can either be created in single or multiple user mode.
In the former case, all transactions are signed by one user,
whereas in the latter case the network participants sign their
own transactions.
In both cases, participants have their own identity that is
used to sign transactions, which is packaged in a business
network card. In multiple user mode, these cards are used
by participants to make their own REST API requests,
rather than have the administrator make all requests on their
behalf, thereby retaining accountability. The initial end-
points allow management of assets and participants. How-
ever, Hyperledger Composer provides a query language to
extend the REST API with custom requests.
To identify network participants, Hyperledger Composer
uses an authentication middleware—Passport.js [44]. Partici-
pants must ﬁrst authenticate themselves with Passport.js using
a service, such as Google. When they do so, Hyperledger
Composer gives the participants an access token.
At this point, Hyperledger Composer also makes a local
wallet available to store business network cards. Hyperl-
edger Composer creates business network cards when it
issues identities for participants in the blockchain. Initially,
these cards lack credentials, but when imported into a wallet
and “pinged”, the network adds credentials to the cards,
allowing further reuse. Thus, whenever a network partici-
pant makes a transaction in the blockchain using the REST
API, they sign the transaction themselves.
Whereas Hyperledger Fabric uses channels to restrict data
sharing in the blockchain, Hyperledger Composer has its own
access control language. This language deﬁnes who has
access to view or modify assets in the blockchain network.
The access control languages also propagate to queries.
Blockchain in healthcare
A short three years after Nakamoto’s white paper, Estonia
had already partnered with the private sector to start storing
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medical records in the blockchain [45]. Since then, more
use cases of the blockchain in healthcare have emerged in
literature, although few implementations are available. In
most cases, giving patients control over their data remains a
priority to instill trust. A literature selection of existing and
proposed systems is provided in Table 1.
Research has mainly focused on sharing Electronic
Health Records (EHR) or Electronic Medical Records
(EMR). The former is usually the focus in a clinical setting
where medical records are used to treat patients. Com-
monly, these systems place data owners in control of their
medical data, allowing them to share sensitive records with
different institutions for improved healthcare. For example,
systems like the Healthcare Data Gateway [17] and MedRec
[46] let clinicians make requests for patient data. In turn,
patients grant or revoke access [17, 46].
Patient control over data, combined with the block-
chain’s immutable structure, makes data sharing more
transparent. Al Omar et al. [47] explain that immutability
makes the process more accountable. In fact, Ekblaw et al.’s
MedRec goes beyond the blockchain’s structure and
improves accountability and transparency by storing the
access history in an always-available summary [46].
Nevertheless, the blockchain is not equipped to store
copious data. As medical data grow, scalability becomes an
additional consideration [48–51]. Existing blockchain
solutions only store limited data in the blockchain itself,
opting instead for more traditional, centralized off-chain
storage approaches, with the blockchain storing only a hash
of the data [46].
In this way, the blockchain’s role transforms into pro-
viding a proof-of-existence [52] or proof-of-integrity
[46, 53, 54] to ensure that medical records exist and have
not been tampered-with respectively. Alternatively, to pre-
serve the utility of the blockchain, Riﬁ et al. [55] propose to
store in it pointers to where the data actually reside.
Sharing sensitive data—or even pointers to it—in the
blockchain exacerbates security and privacy concerns. To
further limit access to EHR or EMR, many existing or
proposed systems restrict the visibility of data. Private
blockchains are the most common solution [29, 56].
Dubovitskaya et al. [56] argue that apart from restricting
access to sensitive data, a permissioned blockchain is faster
and does not require coming up with incentives for miners.
In some cases, private blockchains take the form of a
consortium. A consortium blockchain makes data more
private [57] by restricting access to it to selected organi-
zations [58]. The Blockchain-based Personal Data and
Identity Management System (BPDIMS) [59] is a proposed
solution that uses multiple blockchains to share personal
data—whereas the blockchain is publicly-visible, contribu-
tions to it are permissioned. Grishin et al. [60] achieve a
similar model using the Exonum [61] blockchain.
Conversely, Zhang and Lin’s [62] solution combines private
and consortium blockchains. Each healthcare institution has
its own private blockchain, but different organizations
communicate data through a consortium blockchain.
Although EHR and EMR sharing has been the principal
application for blockchain in healthcare, recent efforts have
started shifting focus to personal health data (PHD). These
systems collect and store PHD from sensors, such as
wearable devices. These systems’ use extends similarly to
popular healthcare solutions, enforcing access control on
this data [63–65].
Genomic research too is emerging as one possible use
case for the blockchain. Zhang et al.’s [66] solution stores
data analyses in the blockchain. Conversely, Grishin et al.’s
[60] Nebula distributes genomic data and computation, with
the blockchain storing the uniform resource locator where
the data are stored.
Whereas privacy concerns are on the forefront of many
of the cited systems, legal issues are emerging in light of the
GDPR, which came into effect in the European Union in
May 2018 to protect the personal data of citizens. In bio-
banking, the GDPR safeguards the safety of research part-
ners without restraining biomedical research by following
two principles: transparency and accountability [67], which
dynamic consent itself shares.
Nevertheless, the compliance of the blockchain with
GDPR is debatable [68]. From a legal standpoint, Berberich
and Steiner [69] mull the question of who the data controller
is in the blockchain structure, where everyone has a copy of
some or all of the data. Thus, ever since the GDPR came
into effect, research has started looking at making
blockchain-based systems that comply with the regulation
[70, 71].
The focus of these systems is normally the use of the
blockchain to store consent for how personal data should be
shared, thereby enforcing individuals’ control [70, 71]. This
is also the case in My Health My Data, a system that aims to
make patients more aware of their data and facilitate med-
ical data sharing for research and healthcare through
dynamic consent. The system stores the dynamic consent
changes in blockchain smart contracts, and as an EU-funded
project, My Health My Data is especially mindful of the
rights that the GDPR gives individuals [72].
Among other rights, the GDPR also allows citizens to
demand the erasure of their data—the right to erasure. This
possibility is seemingly incompatible with the blockchain’s
immutable structure [69]. In the case of My Health My
Data, which plans to store consent information in the
blockchain, this characteristic clashes with the GDPR to the
point that the right to erasure is not planned to be offered to
patients [72]. However, the general trend of storing data off-
chain helps make existing or prospective systems more
compliant [59].
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Table 1 Existing or proposed applications in healthcare and medical research that use the blockchain.
Reference Description Consent Data
deletion
Accessibility Primary data
storage
Technology Stage Availability
Dwarna (described in
this article)
Dwarna is a web portal for ‘dynamic consent’ that
acts as a hub connecting the different stakeholders
of the Malta Biobank—biobank managers,
researchers, research participants, and the general
public. The portal stores research participants’
consent in a blockchain to create an immutable
audit trail of research participants’ consent.
Dwarna’s structure also presents a solution to the
European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)’s right to be forgotten—a
right that is seemingly incompatible with the
blockchain model.
Dynamic Yes Private Mixed Hyperledger
Composer
Prototype GitHub
Al Omar et al. [47] MediBchain is a protocol wherein the blockchain
stores encrypted healthcare data. Users register
with the system, authenticate themselves and send
encrypted healthcare data to the blockchain.
Blockchain transactions return an identiﬁer or
reference.
Not applicable No Blockchain Framework/
Protocol
Chen et al. [54] A proposed system that focuses on the secure
storage of medical records, which are stored off-
chain. The blockchain indexes these records.
Hashing is used to ensure data integrity.
Dynamic Yes Off-chain Proposal/
Design
Choudhury et al. [29] A proposed system of dynamic consent to be
compliant with the IRB regulations on data
collection, with a focus on human research issues,
including those encountered by biobanks. The
proposed system would be hosted on a
Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.
Dynamic Yes Private Off-chain Hyperledger
Fabric
Proposal/
Design
Cyran [58] An Ethereum-based solution that stores references
to healthcare data distributed among many nodes
off-chain. Patients own data, and they can share it
with designated users and revoke that permission
later. The goal is to be able to deploy this system
to a hospital to enable healthcare data sharing
between patients and healthcare professionals.
Dynamic Yes Consortium Off-chain Ethereum
Dey et al. [65] A system wherein a sensor is attached to a patient's
bed and communicates with the IoT platform. This
platform uses a REST API to manage the
healthcare data that are collected by the sensors.
All data are stored on the blockchain.
Not speciﬁed No Blockchain
Dubovitskaya et al. [56] A prototype for sharing EHR aimed at sharing
patient information among hospitals and
aggregating data among researchers on a
Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.
Grant only Yes Private Off-chain Hyperledger
Fabric
Prototype
Ekblaw et al. [46] Medrec permits patients to share healthcare data
with clinicians and revoke permission later. The
Ethereum blockchain stores these permissions. The
data are stored off-chain. Miners—clinicians—are
rewarded by aggregate data. The implementation
is available on GitHub.
Dynamic Yes Off-chain Ethereum Implementa-
tion
GitHub
Faber et al. [59] Blockchain-based Personal Data and Identity
Management System (BPDIMS) is a conceptual
design for a blockchain-based data-sharing
platform aimed at being compliant with the GDPR.
The blockchain stores hashes of data to verify its
integrity. The system has provisions to sell data.
Dynamic Yes Mixed private-
public
Off-chain Proposal/
Design
Griggs et al. [57] A system that is compliant with HIPAA and stores
healthcare data off-chain, with an Ethereum
blockchain recording the fact that events, like the
completion of treatment, were completed. In this
system, sensors communicate with smart devices,
which call Ethereum smart contracts to record that
the data were processed.
Not speciﬁed Yes Consortium Off-chain Ethereum Proposal/
Design
Partial - GitHub
Grishin et al. [60] Nebula is an Exonum blockchain-based system
that distributes data and computation for genomic
research. Genomic data are distributed, and the
blockchain serves as an index. Data owners can
also control access to their information.
Grant only Yes Mixed private-
public
Off-chain Exonum
Hashemi et al. [63] A system to share health data captured by devices
and sensors. It focuses extensively on giving data
owners control over the data that they generate.
Users receive requests and review them.
Dynamic No Blockchain Proposal/
Design
Ichikawa et al. [64] A smartphone health application that focuses on
observing patterns of insomnia, using the
Hyperledger Fabric blockchain to store data. The
focus is on making this data tamper-proof. Users
get feedback about the data that they input.
Not speciﬁed No Private Blockchain Hyperledger
Fabric
Implementa-
tion
Jiang et al. [52] BLOCkchain-Based Platform for Healthcare
Information Exchange (BlocHIE) is designed to
facilitate sharing EHR and PHD. It is made up of
two different blockchains - one to store Electronic
Medical Records, the other for Personal Healthcare
Data. Two fairness-based transaction packing
algorithms are also presented.
Not speciﬁed Yes Public Off-chain Prototype
Panetta and
Cristofaro [72]
My Health My Data is an EU-funded project for
dynamic consent with the aim of facilitating
scientiﬁc medical research and healthcare. The
blockchain is used to store consent changes.
Dynamic No Dynamic consent Proposal/
Design
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For example, MedRec is primarily a blockchain solution,
but it stores sensitive personal information in a more tra-
ditional, centralized off-chain database from wherein data
can be removed. The blockchain itself stores only hashes to
this data, and a log containing patients’ permissions to
clinicians to access data [46].
The USA’s Institutional Review Boards (IRB) [73] also
gives many rights to human participants in research. Some
of these rights are also present in the GDPR and issues like
informed consent are applicable to biobanking. Choudhury
et al. [29] weighed up changes to the IRB and proposed a
design that would put the blockchain in agreement with it.
To the best of our knowledge, the blockchain has not
been adopted yet in any dynamic consent systems in bio-
banking. However, just like the variety of applications in
healthcare, we envisage that dynamic consent can beneﬁt
from the blockchain by not only storing the status of con-
sent, but also by facilitating the means to audit it.
Implementation
Dwarna is primarily a dynamic consent solution, permitting
research partners to better inform and involve themselves in
genomic research. However, Dwarna facilitates genomic
research even in the recruitment stage. The web portal
makes available to the general public governance docu-
ments and information about the Malta Biobank, as well as
video interviews with research partners, relatives of
research partners as well as policy advisers.
Dwarna also provides a short web form that allows
members of the general public to express their interest in
providing a biospecimen and becoming research partners.
The form requires only the full name of the individual and
contact details. An accompanying privacy policy describes
how these details are used. These credentials are forwarded
to the biobank manager, who uses this information to
contact the individual and set up an appointment with them.
The person visits the biobank’s premises, where the
biobank manager describes in detail what dynamic consent
is, covering issues including procedures to be followed with
incidental ﬁndings, withdrawal procedures and data sharing.
At the end, if the individual agrees, they sign a consent form
to bank their sample and they provide a biospecimen.
Once a biospecimen has been provided, the biobank
assigns the individual a pseudonym, which is stored phy-
sically at the biobank. Subsequently, the biobank manager
creates a proﬁle for the individual in the Dwarna web portal;
the login details are the pseudonym, which acts as a user-
name, and a randomly-generated password. The proﬁle also
stores the name and contact details. The login credentials
are sent to the new research partner’s email address. From
Table 1 (continued)
Reference Description Consent Data
deletion
Accessibility Primary data
storage
Technology Stage Availability
Rantos et al. [71] ADVOCATE focuses on consent management of
personal data collected from sensors, with a focus
on being GDPR-compliant.
Dynamic No
Riﬁ et al. [55] A system that feeds data from sensors into an off-
chain database. The Ethereum blockchain stores
pointers to this data. The idea is that patients can
share this data with their doctors.
Not speciﬁed Yes Private Off-chain Ethereum
Xia et al. [48, 49] MeDShare is made up of four layers—the user
layer, the data query layer, an authenticating layer,
and the existing database that stores medical data.
The blockchain stores a history of actions and
requests. The system is aimed at removing the
need for trust in medical data sharing.
Grant only Yes Off-chain
Xia et al. [48, 49] BBDS is made up of three layers—the user layer,
the system management layer that contains the
blockchain, and the storage layer. Medical data are
stored off-chain, and the blockchain contains
details about requests.
Not applicable Yes Off-chain
Yue et al. [17] Healthcare Data Gateways is a three-tiered
approach for patients to share healthcare data with
clinicians. First, the data are stored on the
blockchain—the storage layer. Second, a data
management layer restricts access to the third layer
—the data usage layer.
Grant only No Private Blockchain
Zhang and Lin [62] Each institution has its own private Juice
blockchain that stores its patient data. Data to be
shared among institutions is added to a consortium
blockchain shared by all organizations. The system
focuses on sharing data among hospitals, though
tokens are still required to access a patient's data.
Not applicable No Mixed private-
consortium
Blockchain Juice
Zheng et al. [70] A conceptual design of an Ethereum-based data
sharing system that is compliant with the GDPR.
The system has a mobile application that collects
health data from wearables and stores them in an
off-chain database. The blockchain stores hashes
of this data and some other, necessary metadata.
Dynamic Yes Off-chain Ethereum Proposal/
Design
N. Mamo et al.
that point onward, all further consenting, or withdrawal of
consent, happens via the Dwarna web portal.
Once logged-in, research partners have access to another
page that lists ongoing research studies. When a research
partner clicks on a particular study, they are led to another
page that lists information about the involved researchers,
and their aims and objectives. On this same page, research
partners can give consent or withdraw consent from a study.
However, before giving or withdrawing consent, they need
to be successful in a short test that quizzes them about their
knowledge of what they are consenting to, what consenting
entails and their rights as research partners.
Research partners can visit a particular research study’s
page at any time to alter their consent. Within the context of
Dwarna, where the initial consent to bank the biospecimen
occurs during the preceding face-to-face stage at the bio-
bank, we think of consent simply as the ‘consent change’—
the research partner giving or withdrawing consent in
relation to a particular study. The consent change is saved in
the blockchain, which attaches a timestamp to it.
Over time, giving and withdrawing consent creates a
permanent record of consent changes in the blockchain. The
study page shows a timeline of the research partner’s history
of consent changes to that study. In the rest of this section,
we explain the technical details of how Dwarna handles this
process.
Architecture
We split the implementation of Dwarna into a frontend and
a backend, with the two communicating together through a
REST API, as shown in Supplementary Information
(Fig. SI-1). Following open-source software best practices
[74], we make Dwarna’s entire implementation available on
GitHub under the GNU General Public License v3.0 [75].
Unit tests ensure the implementation’s correctness of the
backend and the REST API.
The frontend is a web portal that is the main point of
communication for the biobank manager, researchers, and
research partners. We implement the portal using the
WordPress content management system (CMS). We
developed a custom WordPress plugin for the dynamic
consent functionality. When users interact with the portal,
Dwarna makes requests to the REST API to update infor-
mation about users, studies or consent.
The backend itself is split into two components that store
Dwarna’s data. First, a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain
stores study identiﬁers and basic information about research
partners, and connects them together with the research
partners’ consent changes. Second, an off-chain Post-
greSQL 10.10 database stores the majority of data about
users and studies.
This separation of data makes it more difﬁcult to access
research partners’ data. As shown in Fig. 3, the links
between the real identities of research partners and their
pseudonyms are stored physically at the biobank. Word-
Press stores and uses these pseudonyms as login usernames.
Dwarna does not use these pseudonyms to represent
research partners in the blockchain, but creates instead new
pseudonyms for them using universally unique identiﬁers
(UUID) [76]. The PostgreSQL database acts as an inter-
mediary between WordPress and the blockchain, storing the
pseudonyms and related UUIDs, as well as other informa-
tion about research partners and the study data.
The blockchain stores only consent changes as booleans
that are true if the research partner gave consent, and false if
they withdrew consent. The consent changes are linked with
the UUID of the research partner who is altering consent
Fig. 3 Dwarna’s data linkage. A simpliﬁed model of the research partners’ data linkage in Dwarna.
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and the study in question. A more detailed ERD with all of
the data collected and stored by Dwarna is shown in Fig. 4.
We serve the frontend and the backend from two dif-
ferent servers. One server hosts the frontend and the off-
chain database, whereas the other hosts the blockchain. We
provide a formal analysis of this architecture as Supple-
mentary Information. We follow the STRIDE [77] metho-
dology to model the security threats in Dwarna, and the
LINDDUN [78] methodology to model the privacy threats.
These threat modeling methodologies show that Dwarna’s
architecture is secure and protects research partners’ data
from illicit access. We describe Dwarna’s different com-
ponents in more detail in the rest of this section.
Frontend
We serve the Dwarna portal using a standard WordPress
[79] installation. The open-source CMS is among the most
commonly used platforms to build websites and blogs—
around a third of all websites use WordPress [80]. Word-
Press’ popularity makes it familiar to internet users, with a
standard layout that makes it easy to use for Dwarna’s users.
Fig. 4 Dwarna’s ERD. An ERD that shows how Dwarna stores its data. Data about research partners, researchers, biobank managers, and studies
are stored in the PostgreSQL database. Consent changes are stored in the blockchain.
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Furthermore, contributors have reﬁned WordPress’ security
and used its plugin architecture to create countless addons
that extend the CMS’ capabilities.
Since WordPress is a CMS, the biobank may keep the
general public updated about ongoing studies. Using
Dwarna, users from the general public can also indicate
their interest in participating in research. For this reason, the
web portal also contains governance documents, videos and
other information to inform prospective research partners
about the biobank, ongoing scientiﬁc studies and the con-
senting procedures.
Users can become research partners by indicating their
interest using a simple online form, which is forwarded to
the biobank manager. This action opens up a direct
channel of communication with the biobank staff and the
recruitment process then proceeds on the biobank
premises.
Once research partners give their consent to the biobank
to collect their biospecimens and data, they are assigned a
unique code—a pseudonym to protect their identity—and a
password. Research partners can use these credentials to log
in to the Dwarna web portal to access their consent trail and
to modify their consent preferences—give consent to new
research projects or withdraw consent from existing ones.
Thus, users indicate interest in becoming research partners
through the web portal, but after physically providing a
biospecimen, any follow-up and re-consenting takes place
on Dwarna.
The biobank-related functionality resides in a custom-
built plugin written in PHP 7. In addition to members of the
general public, we add three new user roles to WordPress’
user management system, each with different capabilities,
as listed in Table 2.
The role of biobank managers includes creating proﬁles
for researchers, and for research partners after they are
recruited. The biobank assigns research partners a pseudo-
nym, which Dwarna uses as a username to allow them to
log in on the portal. Since the link with the real identity is
stored physically at the biobank, Dwarna only ever has
access to this pseudonym.
Biobank managers also create research studies, which
link with the scientiﬁc investigators, or researchers. Parti-
cipating researchers have visibility of aggregate data about
the research partners who consented to the use of their
biospecimen or data in their studies. The biobank handles
the physical provision of biospecimens and data to
researchers.
Research partners log in on the Dwarna portal using their
pseudonym and a password to learn about ongoing research.
If they are inclined to participate in any studies, they may
indicate it by toggling a switch to consent. They can also
withdraw that consent at any time using an identical
mechanism, or demand the erasure of their data and the
destruction of their biospecimen from the biobank.
Research partners retain full visibility over their consent
changes using their consent trail. Each study page shows a
history of when and how research partners consented to
participate in the associated study.
Biobank managers and researchers have access to the
WordPress administration dashboard. Here too, accessi-
bility depends on the user role; biobank managers can create
researchers, research partners and studies from the plugin,
whereas scientiﬁc researchers can only view aggregate data
about the research partners who consented to the use of their
biospecimen and data in their research studies. Our custom
WordPress plugin handles all user input or requests for data,
communicating it to the backend through the REST API.
REST API
Dwarna’s REST API receives requests from the frontend,
validates them, and hands them to the backend, crafting a
response to the frontend. In Dwarna’s architecture, this API
is written in Python 3.7, based on the python-oauth2 fra-
mework [81], and inherits the OAuth 2.0 framework’s
Client Credentials grant [82]. This workﬂow does not
Table 2 The different user roles
and their capabilities in Dwarna.
Role Capability
Biobank manager Create, edit and remove research partners, researchers, and studies
View a list of research partners who consented to the use of their biospecimen and data
in research studies
Researcher View aggregate data about research partners who consented to the use of their
biospecimen and data in their associated studies
Research partner Give or withdraw consent to have their data used in a research study
View a trail of their past consent changes
Request that the biobank destroys their biospecimen and personal data
General public View videos, governance documents and other information about how the Malta
Biobank operates
Indicate their interest in providing a biospecimen and data to be used in research studies
View updates about research studies on the Dwarna blog
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require users to authenticate themselves before making
requests. Instead, the frontend, which acts as Dwarna’s
client in this speciﬁcation, makes all requests on behalf of
its users.
Following the OAuth 2.0 speciﬁcation, the REST API
has two roles, or servers—the authorization and resource
servers. The authorization server assigns clients a unique ID
and an accompanying secret, similar to the standard
username-password authentication, with which to authenti-
cate them. The resource server receives requests with access
tokens and validates them. If the access token is valid and
the request is well-formed, the resource server handles the
request and returns a response.
The workﬂow to view or modify a resource starts by the
frontend making requests to the authorization server for an
access token. In the request, the frontend authenticates itself
by providing its identiﬁer and secret. The request also
describes the access token's desired capabilities—a list of
scopes—and the user on whose behalf it will be used. For
example, a research partner may update their own consent,
but not modify other users. If the identiﬁer and secret
match, the authorization server returns a short-lived access
token that the client uses in subsequent requests to the
resource server.
The resource server performs validation on requests.
Most importantly, it ensures that the provided access tokens
have not expired and have the necessary clearance to access
a particular API endpoint. The REST API also stores the
access token's owner. It uses this ownership information to
restrict the scopes of requests—a research partner may only
access or modify the data that belong to them. If the request
satisﬁes all security measures, it is handed to the appropriate
handler function in the backend to construct a JSON
response. Otherwise, the resource server returns a failure
response to the frontend.
Backend
Dwarna’s backend incorporates two types of REST API
endpoint handlers. The ﬁrst set of functions operates on the
blockchain solution. The second group interacts with an off-
chain PostgreSQL database. The two groups remain syn-
chronized by making calls to each other when necessary.
Many changes in the frontend are reﬂected in the block-
chain or in the off-chain database. For example, when a
research partner is created in WordPress, Dwarna creates a
proﬁle in the PostgreSQL database.
As emphasized by the GDPR [83], Dwarna follows data
minimization best practices to store only the necessary
information about research partners. Apart from minimizing
storage costs, Dwarna’s approach also limits the negative
effects of data breaches or leaks. The system stores basic
information about biobank managers, researchers, and
research partners, as well as information about studies to
which research partners may consent.
Although we follow data minimization best practices,
some personal information is still necessary to be able to re-
contact research partners and to allow them to reset their
passwords. We store personal information in the Post-
greSQL database, whereas WordPress stores the email in its
database. Dwarna protects personal information and the
email address using encryption. The data are decrypted by
the REST API and WordPress respectively when required.
In the off-chain database, we also store additional
research partner information that links them with the
blockchain—credentials to update consent, described fur-
ther down, and UUIDs [76] that create unique blockchain
identities for research partners that are different from their
biobank-assigned pseudonyms. This renders the informa-
tion in the blockchain meaningless without having access to
the off-chain database that links research partners’ repre-
sentation in the frontend—the pseudonym—with their
identities in the blockchain.
Like the PostgreSQL schema, we minimize the data
stored in the blockchain. We use Hyperledger Composer
[84], itself based on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain
framework [85], to host a permissioned blockchain. Apart
from contributing to data security, reaching a consensus on
blocks is more efﬁcient in a permissioned Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain as there is no competition for a crypto-
currency. The ERD is shown in Fig. 4.
Dwarna’s blockchain represents research partners as
blockchain participants. Rather than identifying them by
their biobank-assigned pseudonym, Dwarna assigns
research partners UUIDs, which act as a form of new
pseudonyms to represent blockchain identities. Studies are
assets represented by a unique identiﬁer assigned by the
biobank manager. Dwarna also creates an asset for every
single consent change, which includes not only the involved
Hyperledger Fabric participant and study, but also whether
consent is given or withdrawn and the timestamp when this
change was effected.
In Dwarna, we deploy two Hyperledger Composer REST
APIs. One is dedicated to administration tasks, such as
creating research partners. The other is a multiple user API
that permits research partners to make their own signed
requests, including to update their consent.
To make requests to the multiple user Hyperledger
Composer REST API, research partners have their own
identities, which are packaged in business network cards.
These cards are used by users to make their own requests,
rather than have the administrator make all requests on their
behalf, thereby retaining accountability.
Dwarna’s REST API takes on the role of transforming
the biobank’s pseudonym into the research partner’s iden-
tities in the blockchain—the UUID. In Dwarna, the REST
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API creates one blockchain identity—a UUID and a busi-
ness network card—for each study that a research partner
participates in. When they return to withdraw consent, or to
give consent to a study they previously participated in, the
REST API fetches the same identity that they used in the
past to consent to that study. Thus, research partners have as
many identities as the number of studies that they
participated in.
Before using these cards to give or withdraw consent,
research partners need to authenticate with Hyperledger
Composer’s multiple user REST API. Hyperledger Com-
poser uses Passport.js to authenticate participants. We
developed a custom Passport strategy that checks only
whether users have logged-in on the portal and returns their
username. Once they log in, Hyperledger Composer gives
research partners an access token, which combines with the
business network card returned by the REST API to make
requests to the Hyperledger Composer multiple user
REST API.
Initially, the research partners’ cards lack credentials.
However, when the REST API returns the card, Dwarna
automatically imports the card to their local wallet and re-
authenticates to record this new card. Then, Dwarna “pings”
the multiple user REST API—an action that adds creden-
tials to the card, which is saved to the database for
future reuse.
Since research partners make their own requests, Dwarna
uses Hyperledger Composer’s access control language to
restrict their capabilities and protect against unauthorized
data access. The rules dictate that research partners can only
effect consent changes on their own behalf and view their
own consent changes.
With credentials added to the card, research partners can
set consent by sending their access token to Dwarna’s
REST API, which creates a consent asset in the blockchain.
The consent asset is created asynchronously, using the
provided access token so that the transaction is signed by
the research partner while simultaneously allowing research
partners to continue navigating Dwarna.
Figure 5 depicts this process, starting from a logged-in
research partner authenticating with Hyperledger Compo-
ser, to getting their own identity and ﬁnally setting consent.
Naturally, some steps, such as issuing new identities, are not
performed when research partners have already consented
to the study.
Finally, we make use of Hyperledger Composer’s query
language to facilitate data requests. We use queries to fetch
the consent trail of a research partner in a single study, and
another that checks whether the research partner has con-
sented to the use of their biospecimen and data in a study.
The access control language propagates even to these
queries—research partners may only view their own con-
sent trails. A third query, targeted for use by administrators
to fetch a list of research partners who are participating in a
study, fetches all research partners’ consent changes in
one study.
Discussion
Dynamic consent aims to empower research partners to
become active participants in scientiﬁc research projects.
Dwarna aims to increase trust in this process by injecting
transparency and accountability. Simultaneously, we keep
in mind the expectations of privacy and security that sur-
round the sharing of sensitive consent data.
Trust in the biobanking process is contingent on how
the web portal stores its data. Dwarna’s data are notably
separated in three different databases—consent data in
the blockchain, user and study information in the off-
chain PostgreSQL database, and login information in
WordPress' database. Dwarna adopts data minimization
best practices and stores only the necessary consent-
related information.
The GDPR emphasizes the need to safeguard personal
sensitive information and suggests data minimization as one
way of optimizing privacy by reducing the stored data to a
minimum [83]. The GDPR regulates organizations to store
and process data which is considered indispensable for the
research process [67]. Since the Malta Biobank itself stores
and handles the biospecimens and identiﬁable data, Dwarna
stores only the research partners' pseudonyms—the link
itself is stored in a physical ledger.
Dwarna deals only with the processing of pseudony-
mized consent data since anonymization in biobanking is
often futile; anonymization strips biospecimens and data of
any identiﬁability with the personal identities of research
partners. Thus, anonymization eliminates the possibility for
research partners to request that their biospecimens and
personal data are destroyed and erased respectively from the
biobank.
Furthermore, biospecimens used for biomedical research
are most of the time only fully effective when examined in
combination with the personal medical history of the
research partner. Since medical histories evolve over time
and thus require updating, a link between a biospecimen
stored in a biobank and the identity of the research partners
is essential, as accessing medical histories would be
impossible if data were to be fully anonymized.
Anonymization also eradicates the possibility of re-
contacting research partners if reuse of their biospecimens
and data require re-consenting. Similarly, it makes the right
of research partners to withdraw consent impossible since
anonymized data can never be linked back to the data
subject. Consequently, full anonymity is a threat to effective
genomic research and biobanking [33].
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Dynamic consent does away with the need for anon-
ymization [9] and uses pseudonymization, which is a
compromise that allows for communication between sta-
keholders whilst protecting research partners’ privacy.
The GDPR, which does not apply to anonymized data,
considers pseudonymization of personal data as a safeguard
in the context of genomic research as it “can reduce the
risks to the data subjects concerned and help controllers
and processors to meet their data-protection obligations”
[86]. It gives research partners more control over their
personal data, permits feedback and keeps researchers
accountable [87].
In the Dwarna web portal pseudonymization allows us
to obfuscate the link between research partners' identities
and their consent. In fact, linking a research partner’s
consent information with their identities requires two
links. The ﬁrst link is the codiﬁed connection between a
research partner’s real identity and their pseudonym
stored physically at the Malta Biobank. The second link is
the research partners' UUID representation in the block-
chain solution that is separate from the biobank's
pseudonym.
We store the link between the pseudonym and the
blockchain UUIDs in the off-chain PostgreSQL database,
with the goal of isolating the different data of research
partners. In this architecture, access to one database yields
little information about individuals. Connecting consent
changes to research partners’ real identities requires both
links. Even if someone had to gain access to the entirety of
Dwarna’s data, it would not yield the real-life identities of
research partners since the link is secured physically at the
biobank.
Fig. 5 The authentication and consenting workﬂow. Research
partners ﬁrst authenticate themselves with Hyperledger Composer.
Dwarna then issues identities for them if need be, saving the business
network card in the off-chain database for later reuse. Research part-
ners can then consent to research studies.
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Another beneﬁt of segregating data in the off-chain
database and in the blockchain is that linkage attacks
become all the more difﬁcult. These kinds of attacks happen
by combining auxiliary knowledge with the pseudonymized
records to cancel out the de-identiﬁcation process [88]. For
example, knowing that one person in a small community
has a rare disease acts as auxiliary knowledge. This infor-
mation could be used to crack a person’s pseudonym if
someone knows they are participating in research about this
rare disease. However, our blockchain solution makes this
doubly difﬁcult.
First, the research partners’ UUIDs yield no information
about their real identity; for that, access to both the off-
chain and the biobank’s physical registry is necessary.
Second, inferring who the research partner is through the
studies that they are participating in is difﬁcult because no
study information is stored in the blockchain except a study
identiﬁer. For that too, access to the off-chain database is
necessary. These two elements render linkage attacks
extremely difﬁcult without access to the off-chain database.
Having multiple UUIDs, or blockchain identities, also
adds a layer of security. When research partners have
multiple identities, inferring one identity does not yield
information about their participation in other research stu-
dies. Given that there was sufﬁcient external knowledge in
the ﬁrst place to make the ﬁrst inference, then Dwarna gives
away no new knowledge beyond what is already known.
The only trade-off is that issuing new blockchain identities
is marginally slower than re-using the same blockchain
identity across all studies.
The separate storage of consent data in the blockchain
also contributes to security and accountability. Our decision
to host consent data on a permissioned blockchain means
that it is cordoned off from the rest of the world, and
through the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain, every consent
transaction is permanently etched in the ledger. Moreover,
as a private blockchain with no native cryptocurrency,
Hyperledger Composer makes the process of committing
consent changes much more efﬁcient; unlike Ekblaw et al.’s
MedRec, which uses Ethereum and its cryptocurrency [46],
Dwarna does not need to come up with an incentive scheme
for its miners.
Nonetheless, our decision to store data in the blockchain
contrasts with the majority of existing studies that use the
blockchain to handle the sharing, not storage, of EHR or
EMR. However, we argue that this gives Dwarna an added
layer of security. In literature, off-chain storage is often a
decision driven by scalability concerns [55, 89]. Con-
versely, Dwarna faces few scalability issues as it stores only
basic consent data that use up far less space than EHR
or EMR.
By using the blockchain to store the consent changes and
associate them with UUIDs, rather than the biobank’s
pseudonyms, we isolate this data from the identiﬁable
information. Since the blockchain and the off-chain data-
base reside on different servers, using different identities for
consenting renders the blockchain data almost worthless in
isolation. The provision of two servers also allows for blind
administrators—one for each server.
This makes all biobank operations transparent and
accountable, while protecting the identities of research
partners that are giving or withdrawing consent. We use this
foundation to give research partners visibility of the consent
process. Research partners can, at any time, audit their own
consent trail from the frontend. The individual components
of Dwarna protect the data of research partners by con-
trolling access to it.
Although the blockchain’s permanence is desirable, it
seems to contradict the GDPR’s right to erasure, though the
regulation does acknowledge that for scientiﬁc research it
may be lawful to retain the data [13]. The immutability at
the core of the blockchain creates an intransigent audit trail
allowing for full transparency, thus keeping data controllers
accountable. In Dwarna, the difference in the representation
of research partners in the off-chain and blockchain data-
base is a compromise to bring Dwarna’s blockchain in
agreement with the GDPR.
The link that connects pseudonymized research partners
with their UUIDs in the blockchain resides in the off-chain
database. This nonimmutable database is compliant with the
GDPR and, when required, erasing the records of research
partners in the off-chain database breaks the link between
the biobank’s pseudonym and the research partner’s UUIDs
and severs their identiﬁability in the blockchain. Since
blockchain identities are not reused, the research partners’
consent changes become unreachable, even with linkage
attacks.
A private blockchain makes linkage attacks more difﬁ-
cult by restricting data access. While a private blockchain
contributes an elevated sense of security, it is also a com-
promise with transparency as it is more centralized. We rely
on Hyperledger Composer’s access control and business
network cards to track who made which consent changes.
The web portal complements Hyperledger Composer’s
protection with its own forms of security. WordPress cre-
dentials, restricted access to the OAuth 2.0-protected REST
API and Hyperledger Composer’s own security combine to
protect illicit access to user information. We serve these
APIs over the HTTPS protocol, and lock the Hyperledger
Composer administration REST API behind a ﬁrewall.
These security measures also minimize the risk of
impersonation. The most obvious point of failure is gaining
access to a user’s username and password. WordPress stores
these passwords in hashed form using salt [90] to diminish
the risk of accessing passwords through a data breach. In
the future, other mechanisms, like two-factor authentication
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could be used to mitigate risks of accessing user credentials.
The other points of failure are the database, which stores the
encrypted business network cards, and the REST API.
However, here too, access is governed by credentials.
Genomic research is principally about striking a balance
between the risks that emerge with the provision of DNA
for research and utility of the storage of such data: Oliver
et al. claim that “participants are making a deliberate
privacy-utility trade-off” [31]. The use of the blockchain
within the core of Dwarna’s structure reaches the goal of
injecting transparency and accountability into dynamic
consent while safeguarding research partners from poten-
tially harmful data breaches.
Conclusion
Trust is key to the success of biobanking for genomic
research and depends on robust governance procedures
upholding continuous transparency and accountability.
Dynamic consent empowers research partners and makes
them feel valued as a part of the system that contributes
actively for improved healthcare. By hosting consent
changes in a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain, Dwarna makes
this process transparent.
Simultaneously, Dwarna complies with the GDPR by
keeping separate its data from the Malta Biobank’s own
data and by following data minimization best practices.
Dwarna also permits the GDPR’s right to erasure to co-exist
with the blockchain while protecting research partners’
consent information.
Dwarna is open-source and can be used in scenarios
where dynamic consent is required. In the future, shifting
from a permissioned blockchain to a consortium blockchain
could further increase transparency. In the context of bio-
banking, the consortium could include members of existing
biobanking infrastructures, such as BBMRI-ERIC, to
increase transparency and facilitate the sharing of biospe-
cimens and data among biobanks. The implementation can
also be easily adapted to perform the tasks of more tradi-
tional EHR or EMR systems; instead of associating consent
with studies, the blockchain could store patient consent to
share EHR or EMR data with clinicians or healthcare
institutions.
Finally, a more robust model could lay the foundation for a
closer collaboration between biobank managers, researchers,
and research partners. A more trustworthy relationship could
permit a system that uses wearable technologies to collect
data from research partners on a daily basis. This data could
give researchers insights about the health of research partners,
facilitating biomedical research and making research partners
even more actively involved.
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